Kenya’s incursion into Somalia has crossed the 100-day water mark and unless the government can put a new spin on the military operation, it has for all practical purposes slowed down considerably and is certainly not uppermost in the minds of the populace. Without strategic focus or a viable exit plan, chances are that the situation will get worse. As it is, the Kenya Defence Forces are taking  casualties and much as the military top brass have sought to focus  attention  on the toll it has inflicted on the rag tag Al Shabaab militia, lack of corroborative evidence has render these declarations somewhat suspect.

Even the much-touted absorption of the KDF into the African Union-mandated AMISOM force is yet to take effect, amid reports of simmering unease about placing Kenyan troops under  the command of a Ugandan.

Seemingly searching for  ideas, the weekly military briefings that are expected to provide a link between the public and the operation in Somalia no longer attract undivided attention. Unless, of course, the soldiers goof  as they did when  spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir downloaded old pictures of an execution by the Al Shabaab and attempted to pass them off as evidence of a recent event. He was swiftly called out when a US-based Somali journalist proved  that the pictures were taken much earlier  and had already been posted on the net. To its credit, KDF swiftly apologised.

After weeks of heady talk about the imminent fall of Afmadow and the port of Kismayu, it came as something of a surprise when Kenya’s Defence Minister Mohammed Yusuf Haji declared that the assault on the strategically situated port was off the cards unless the UN stepped in to foot the bill.

Indeed the Kenya government needs to level up with the Kenyan people and tell them how much the war is costing them or has cost them so far. The KDF needs to tell Kenyans how much Al Shabaab has been downgraded and pushed back. Has the KDF made discernible progress against Al Shabaab? If yes why has the militia become more ruthless, daring and focused in its attacks on the force  and on targets inside Kenya? In its most recent attack in Wajir it targeted an Administration Police camp and kidnapped government officials. Was that a telling signal that this was no longer the hapless and misguided terror militia harassing its fellow nationals and kidnaping helpless victims for extortion?

Has not the  incursion, which was meant to have been in hot pursuit of the militia, evolved into a fully-fledged invasion and as a result a propaganda victory for the Al Shabaab? The invasion and killing of civilians in the course of exchanges between the KDF and Al Shabaab has played into the hands of the detested terror gang. Kenya has somewhat legitimised it by going after it full throttle.

Indeed, the fact that the US government used its special forces to free aid workers – American Jessica Buchanan and Dane Poul Hagen – who were working for the Danish De-mining Group (DDG) rather than use the KDF, Ethiopian or even the AMISOM forces, speaks volumes.

It exposes  the capacity shortcomings of the armies and as the KDF heads into its fourth month in Somalia, there is need to pause and rethink. The reasons for the incursion might have been valid but is the strategy right? The government and the KDF believe that the incursion’s short term goal of partly disabling and pushing back the militia has been achieved. But keeping the troops indefinitely in Somalia during an election year is not a comforting prospect.

The cost to the exchequer is extremely high and fears that it might become a campaign issue disheartening.  Belt tightening in ministries is slowing down rendition of services as funding is reduced drastically.

Kenya is not the first country to go into Somalia; Ethiopia and the US have been there before and both left when they found the campaigns unsustainable. It is a lesson that Kenya should learn - you quit when you are still ahead.