US nudges Kenya to take the lead but at whose cost?

S Vice-President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Kenya clearly demonstrated that the sole superpower expects Nairobi to take the lead in providing a lasting solution to the Somali problem. But the question is whether the new approach is to protect  Kenyan or  US interests in the region, as  al-Shabaab, the Somali insurgent group, poses an increasing security threat to  East Africa.

It is no secret that  al-Shabaab —with the strong support of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda— is now a major threat to American installations and interests in the region. The visit was seen as a signal to Washington’s determination to bolster support for the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which has been braving the onslaught of the  Islamic insurgents.

Thus, Kenya was expecting the US to announce specific programmes that can enable it to provide leadership in the search for a solution to the Somali problem. Yet, the only concrete help from Biden—at least in public—was that the US is Government will assist Kenya secure its borders with Somalia.

However Somalia watchers are of the view that the US is more keen on sealing the border to prevent attacks on its installations and interests in East Africa,  which is still not a long term solution to the Somali problem. Kenya would rather the US puts in a good word for it with the UN Security Council to upgrade the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a peace enforcing outfit with complete funding by the global body.

AMISOM first entered Somalia in September 2007 in readiness for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2008. But a weak mandate and insufficient troops are hampering efforts by AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to drive  al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu, three years down the line.

The latest experience with the US intervention has been the war against piracy off the Somali coast. The US and EU naval ships that are patrolling the Indian Ocean are not only carrying out pre-emptive attacks on pirates, but are also keen on arresting them and shipping them to Kenya for trials. Yet, very few of these countries are willing to underwrite the cost of trials and the danger that such trials expose Kenya to.

Despite midwifing the 2004 Somali peace deal, Kenya has always wanted to be seen to be operating within the parameters of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), not withstanding the reality that as a frontline state, the chaos in Somalia is hurting it more than any other country in the region.

Early last year, the US asked Kenya to prevent its territory from being used by some airlines to ferry suspected terrorists to Somalia. It is not clear whether Kenya has the capacity to implement this request and also whether it would not amount to interference in private enterprises.

CITIZEN

By being seen to be working closely with US to fight al-Shabaab, Kenya could become a target of other international terrorist groups. Furthermore, there is fear that by getting directly involved in Somalia, Kenya could antagonise its own 2 million citizens of  Somali origin and Muslims in general.

The conflict is not a Somali conflict anymore and there are suspicions that some individuals, mostly in the senior leadership of al-Shabaab, are affiliated either directly or indirectly with international terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda. The US may have no choice but to help Kenya and other IGAD members find a lasting solution to the Somali problem.

In mid June, the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Mr Johnnie Carson, indicated that the Obama administration had placed Africa high on the agenda, unlike the previous administrations that overlooked the continent.

He reiterated that US policy in Somalia is guided by support for the Djibouti peace process. The Djibouti peace process is an African-led initiative which enjoys the support of IGAD. “The US recognises that any long-term solution to the crisis in Somalia must be an inclusive political solution,” he said.

That being the case, the US has provided limited military support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by   President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, but has declined directly coordinating the military operations of the TFG.

The US has supported AMISOM by assisting in acquisition of non-lethal equipment to the governments of Burundi and  Uganda which have deployed their troops in Mogadishu. It has also provided military equipment, communications gear and uniforms. The US has also supported the training of TFG forces outside of Somalia, mostly in Uganda and Djibouti.

HESITATION

But this indirect US involvement, coupled with the reluctance of other African countries to send troops to Somalia, has put AMISOM in a precarious situation. Since its debacle in Mogadishu in the early 1990s, the US has not been keen to be directly involved in the Somalia conflict.

After years of keeping aloof, Washington teamed up with Ethiopia at the end of 2006 to oust the moderate Union of Islamic Courts with the intention of flushing out terrorists. This experiment collapsed early last year, when Ethiopia withdrew without destroying the terrorists’ cells. The invasion instead saw the strengthening of al-Shabaab, which had become more radical during the Ethiopia occupation, and which was no longer under the influence of the religious courts.

Even though al-Shabaab may not be a threat to Kenya because of its capacity on the battlefront, Kenya is a frontline state and a country with the highest population of Kenyans of Somali stock. Kenya suffers from insecurity and the drain on its social resources, thanks to the conflicts.

Washington on its part is more concerned with al-Shabaab’s possible influence on moderate Muslim populations throughout the Horn of Africa, especially in the face of widespread unemployment that makes the youth targets of recruitment by the rebels. Kenya, since 2004 has been accused of having an incoherent policy towards Somalia, leaving Ethiopia to take charge.

ACCOMODATIVE

On the other hand, Kenya keeps on bending over backwards to accommodate US interests in the region, but US has been snubbing Kenya’s needs and interests unless they are connected to terrorism.  It is still too early to tell whether the Obama administration will change this approach, especially in relation to Somalia.

AMISOM has the mandate of peace-keeping and is not allowed to act as a peace enforcer. The initial plan was to have over 8,000 troops on the ground contributed by various countries. Uganda was the first to send approximately 1,500  troops, followed by Burundi a while later. Another contingent of Ugandans, was deployed in February 2008, some of which were rotated.

Then the Second Burundian battalion landed in February 2008. Ghana and Nigeria were supposed to follow in March 2008, but nothing has materialised. Uganda and Burundi have offered to augment their forces, but other countries seem to think that this could turn the Somalia mission into a Uganda/Burundi affair